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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour(s) gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden. To Washington Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302 and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 22 May 1992	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED MONOGRAPH
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES BASED CONTINGENCY FORCES IN OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) MAJ HARRY E. JOHNSON SR., USA			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES ATTN: ATZL-SWV FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-6900 COM (913) 684-3437 AUTOVON 552-3437		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) <i>SEE ATTACHED</i>			
			
14. SUBJECT TERMS OPERATIONS TO RESTORE ORDER, STABILITY OPERATIONS CONTINGENCY FORCES, PEACEMAKING		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 46	
		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLASSIFIED	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLASSIFIED	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

The Role of United States Based Contingency Forces in Operations to Restore Order

A Monograph
by

Major Harry E. Johnson Sr.
Infantry



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Second Term AY 91-92

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92-24525



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
SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

MONOGRAPH APPROVAL

Major Harry E. Johnson Sr.

Title of Monograph: The Role of United States Based
Contingency Forces in Operations
to Restore Order

Approved by




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Accepted this 3rd day of June 1991

ABSTRACT

The Role of United States Based Contingency Forces in Operations to Restore Order by MAJ Harry E. Johnson Sr., USA, 46 pages.

This purpose of this monograph is to discuss the roles and missions United States military forces will have to accomplish during operations to restore order. Operations to restore order are military operations designed to halt violence and restore normal civil activities thereby encouraging the resumption of political and diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict. The thesis of this monograph is that operations to restore order are vital missions that will require the use of United States military forces to prevent human suffering or protect national security interests.

The paper uses Operation Power Pack and Operation Provide Comfort as historical examples of United States military forces conducting operations to restore order. The paper uses these examples to determine the challenges military forces might face in future operations to restore order. This analysis led to four key missions that contingency forces will have to accomplish in operations to restore order; conduct forced entry operations, establish security zones, stabilize the population, and provide human assistance.

The monograph concludes that the instability caused by population growth, declining economies, drug trafficking, and weapons proliferation threatens the security of the United States and her allies. The United States must be prepared to use to use military force to respond to domestic and allied needs for regional stability. Consequently military commanders and their staffs must be ready to conduct joint and combined operations to restore order.

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I. Introduction.

Helping create a stable world where human rights and democracy can flourish and to maintain cooperative relations with friendly nations have long been among United States national security objectives.¹ Unfortunately, the struggle for political and economic freedom is growing violent in several regions of the world. Since America is a superpower, our allies look to us to use our elements of national power to promote peace. To support the national security objectives the United States armed services must be prepared to conduct operations to restore order.

The purpose of this monograph is to discuss the roles and missions United States contingency forces will have to accomplish if America must rely on military power to restore order in a foreign country. The thesis of this paper is that operations to restore order are vital missions that will require the use of American military force to prevent incidents of continued social turmoil and political instability. To support this thesis the paper discusses the need for operations to restore order and gives two examples where United States forces conducted stability operations. The focus then shifts to the roles and

missions United States forces must perform in future operations to restore order.

The structure and missions of today's army are changing. In the past, our national military strategy hinged on the mission to contain the spread of communism, and accomplished this by expanding the force structure and establishing a forward presence overseas. Eventually communist societies buckled, unable to keep up with the manpower, equipment, and technology fielded by the United States and her allies. Since the allies were victorious in the cold war the United States military now faces the challenge of trimming back its military forces and equipment based on political perceptions of a reduced threat.

Inherent in this challenge to redesign the military is the mission to maintain the capability to function as the world's champion of democracy. Thus we are faced with a dilemma. How do we downsize the military to satisfy domestic economic needs while maintaining the capability to ensure we can preserve our national ideals of international peace and stability? Although we are entering an era where there is a decreased threat to our way of life, United States forces must stand ready to rapidly respond to national or international pleas to reduce human suffering and ensure democracy in a changing world.

While many of the changes are positive, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the unification of Germany and talks to unite the Korean peninsula, there is still a high degree of uncertainty about the stability of new democracies forming around the globe. To ensure the continued security of America's global interests, the military must wrestle with the problem of enforcing regional stability and institutionalizing the growth of democracy in republics torn by political, religious, and economic differences. To solve this problem we must first determine how military power can be used to counter negative influences such as terrorism, drug trafficking, weapons proliferation, and abuses of human rights.

Many politicians view the fall of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a sign of decreased threat to the United States. However, the breakup created a new national security concern. The Soviet influence helped stabilize relations between the Soviets and other communist republics. The economic, military, and political competition being generated by the republic's move toward democracy is generating other destabilizing factors not only among the Commonwealth of Independent States but in other budding democracies throughout the third world.

Uneven economic development is resulting in

increased debt in many third world economies. Many developing nations find themselves pitted against their neighbors for decreasing supplies of natural resources. To help raise their standard of living some countries and many poverty stricken societies are falling prey to drug cartels which install drug based economies. These cartels often use terror to control the populace.²

Another major factor contributing to regional instabilities is an increase in ethnic and religious conflicts. Many nations are using their new found freedom as an excuse to rekindle irredentist claims that would change existing national boundaries. The desire for ethnic and religious independence has already led to violence in former Soviet and Yugoslavian Republics. We can expect the number of violent confrontations to escalate as factions within developing nations continue vying for control of previously shared elements of national power.

The result of all these changes in the world order may very well be increased incidences of low intensity conflict over the next 10 - 15 years. The emergence of new nations states from the ashes of the former Soviet Union will only serve to promote instability on the Eurasian land mass. We can also expect armed resistance from the ruling elite as more and more

countries in Africa and Latin America attempt to transition to democratic forms of government. Communism has not totally disappeared as a form of political and economic control. Communist leaders and parties will continue to resist the growing trends toward the formation of democratic governments. They will not hesitate to use force to maintain their way of life.

The most dangerous trend in the international arena is the widespread proliferation of military weapons and capabilities. At least 56 countries are currently capable of engaging in mid-intensity conflict. These nations can field military forces that consist of a minimum of 700 tanks/armored personnel carriers, 100 combat aircraft, 500 artillery pieces, and over 100,000 military personnel.³ Illegal technology transfers and growing regional competition will fuel the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By the year 2000 as many as 8 new countries could have nuclear weapons while up to 30 new countries could possess chemical weapons. Fifteen more nations may also possess or be producing ballistic missiles.⁴

Now that the cold war is over, the United States is once again viewed as the nation most capable of dealing with these threats to international

stability. Since we are not a nation that has the acquisition of new territories or economic or political dominance as a national objective we are in a unique position of trusted leadership. Many nations look to us to take the lead in providing international stability. Our allies also look to us to provide forces for international security.⁶

The American military is changing to meet these new challenges by tailoring its forces to respond to threats in a different fashion. Deterring conflict is still our main objective, however crisis response from the continental United States is becoming more important as we continue to downsize our forces and reduce our presence in overseas locations. As western military powers continue to reduce the size of their individual military forces, the measure of a nation's status as a world power will be its ability to project military forces to defend its territorial limits while simultaneously protecting its allies and its other foreign interests.

III. Peacekeeping versus Stability Operations.

Over the last forty years nations have relied heavily on peacekeeping forces to assist in preventing the resumption of violent conflicts. The term

peacekeeping covers a wide variety of security functions which include military observation, supervision of cease fires, diplomatic efforts, and security assistance. Peacekeeping forces can accomplish these tasks within certain constraints. In order to understand the limitations of peacekeeping forces it is important that we understand the definition of 'peacekeeping operations.' Most United Nations members and their military forces view peacekeeping as it is defined by the International Peace Academy:

'...the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally using multi-national forces of soldiers, police, and civilians to restore and maintain peace.'

Usually when the American military refers to peacekeeping we use it as a synonym for the United Nations sanctioned rules regarding the use of military forces to control violence. United States doctrine defines peacekeeping as the efforts taken with the consent of the civil or military authorities of the belligerent parties to maintain a negotiated truce. In our doctrine peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to maintain peace and stability in

areas of potential or actual conflict. Usually United States forces will only participate in peacekeeping operations as part of a multinational force sponsored by the United Nations or some other international organization such as the Organization of American States.⁷

A close scrutiny of the aforementioned definitions of peacekeeping reveals several constraints which limit their utility. Peacekeeping operations are designed to maintain peaceful agreements that have already been obtained through diplomatic efforts or have been agreed to by the belligerent parties. Usually the belligerents have agreed to separate and establish a security zone. Consequently the peacekeeper's business is to monitor the security zone and report infractions to the responsible international authority. Almost all of the United Nation's fourteen peacekeeping missions were "observer" missions.*

There are several other preconditions that can limit the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations as a means of pursuing international stability. The peacekeeping effort usually has the consent and recognition of a large portion of the international community. Consequently, a clear mandate for the operation exists from the outset. Inherent in the

consent to peacekeeping operations are basing and overflight rights, freedom of movement for the forces, and a status of forces agreement. Negotiating these rights is a time consuming process.

Peacekeeping operations are very expensive. A single guard post manned around the clock costs between \$80,000 - \$100,000 a year when one includes guard pay, supervision, medical bills, and training costs. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council protested in 1988 when they learned the cost of United Nations peacekeeping missions was going to rise from \$300 million a year to \$2 billion a year.*

The biggest constraint to peacekeeping operations is that military personnel cannot use force to separate the warring factions or to enforce a truce. Soldiers conducting peacekeeping operations must limit any use of force to situations involving self defense. The use of force, no matter how well justified, will give the impression that the peacekeeping force is taking sides in the conflict. This often leads to escalations in violence especially if there is a mistake and someone is killed.¹⁰.

Unfortunately, American leaders cannot expect belligerents to make the conciliations necessary for the intervention of peacekeeping forces. There will

be potentially explosive situations where force will be necessary to prevent an escalation to violent confrontation. During these crisis situations, closure times can become critical. The key to preventing more bloodshed will be to put the soldiers on the ground before the situation becomes uncontrollable. Accomplishing this mission requires a task force trained and capable of moving fast to the threatened region. The task force must also be disciplined so that their presence, although confrontational, has minimal impact on the local populace. Oftentimes the indicator of success will be what did not happen instead of what did happen.

Because of the political constraints, coordination, and agreements involved in peacekeeping operations a major power like the United States may find it necessary to launch a military operation designed to rapidly resolve a conflict and enforce stability within a state or region. This "stability" operation may be necessary when human suffering prohibits the long delays necessary to negotiate a truce and organize a United Nations sanctioned peacekeeping operation. Stability operations may also stem from needs that are more economic than altruistic. For example, the interruption of the free flow of oil from the Middle East would have a profound

impact on the economic and military security of most western powers. The United States could find it necessary to conduct combined or joint stability operations in that region to protect national or allied security interests.

Unlike peacekeeping operations, stability operations attempt to impose peace by using force to separate the belligerents and stabilize the situation. The ultimate goal of stability operations is to create a situation where military forces can end violent conflict and induce the belligerents to seek diplomatic agreements that allow those forces or follow-on forces to transition to peacekeeping operations and humanitarian assistance as quickly as possible.¹¹

United States doctrine addresses stability operations as a contingency operation within the area of Low Intensity Conflict. Low Intensity Conflict is a political - military confrontation between contending states or groups that is below conventional war and above peacetime competition. The doctrine refers to the aforementioned stability operations as operations to restore order. The doctrine, found in Joint Pub 3 - 07 Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, defines operations to restore order as operations to halt violence and restore

normal civil activities thereby encouraging the resumption of political and diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict.¹² Unlike peacekeeping operations it is unlikely that the consent of all belligerents will be obtained before or after the operation commences.

Operations to restore order may be conducted unilaterally or in cooperation with other countries. United States forces conducting operations to restore order will not usually function as a disinterested party. Military action will be taken to support United States or foreign interests or to protect United States citizens.

The biggest difference between peacekeeping operations and operations to restore order is that operations to restore order could initially require or suddenly deteriorate into combat. This means the combatant command conducting the operation must plan for contingencies that could initially be violent in nature. Operations to restore order imply that there is some type of violence already in progress within the area of operation. Therefore it may well be necessary for the combatant commander to use externally imposed military force to end the ongoing conflict.

There are several examples where a major power

opted to conduct stability operation to restore order. Two examples where foreign powers unilaterally used military force to restore order are the British use of force in Gambia in 1982 and India's use of force in Sri Lanka in 1988. United States policymakers have also opted to use military force to restore order in foreign countries. Two examples of United States military operations to restore order are Operation Power Pack and Operation Provide Comfort.

Operation Power Pack: General Harold Johnson, the United States Army Chief of Staff, labeled American military operations in the Dominican Republic 1965 - 1966 as stability operations. Prior to this labeling United States forces considered operations to restore order as special warfare. General Johnson realized they were not special operations and he believed the use of force to safeguard or reestablish the peace and stability in areas threatened by conflict was a major mission for conventional military forces.

General Johnson and General Palmer, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations who would later command the United States force in the Dominican Republic, believed stability operations were a form of limited warfare where political considerations would dictate the focus of the military operations. According to General Palmer the goal of stability

operations was to establish a climate of order, without regard for any particular faction or political group, so that other forces could work in a peaceful environment to help the country attain its legitimate aspirations.¹³

In April 1965 a violent civil war erupted in the Dominican Republic between rebel forces who supported exiled constitutionalist President Juan Bosch and loyalist military officers who supported the installation of a triumvirate headed by Donald Reid Cabral. The rebels entered the capital city of Santa Domingo seized the Presidential Palace and placed Cabral under arrest. They declared they were going to return Bosch to power and set up a provisional government. Loyalist officers quickly responded by attacking the palace and rebel military camps.

Members of the State Department's country team recommended a United States military show of force as a means of to induce the restoration of order. At the same time the team admitted that conditions in the capital city bordered on anarchy. The streets of Santa Domingo became increasingly dangerous and at one time armed rebels, looking for an anti-communist reporter fire over the heads of foreign nationals waiting to leave the embattled city. United States military involvement commenced with the landing of

536 marines to supervise non - combatant evacuation operations and to bolster embassy security. Meanwhile the bloody civil war spread throughout the city.¹⁴

The marine landings proved insufficient to meet United States political objectives to restore law and order, prevent a communist takeover, and protect American lives. As the situation continued to deteriorate the United States Ambassador to the Dominican Republic requested more troops to help restore order and prevent a communist takeover of the government. Eventually United States troop strength grew to approximately 24,000 personnel.

The stability operations took place in three phases. During the initial part of the operation, Marines from the 6th Marine Expeditionary Brigade established a security perimeter around the United States Embassy and the Hotel Embajador. Some companies reached their objective without incident. Others ran into stiff rebel resistant. The marines, restricted to using small arms fires, took several casualties before receiving permission to use heavier weapons to dislodge enemy snipers.

While the marines were establishing their perimeter, troops from the 82nd Airborne Division landed at San Isidoro to establish an airhead, clear

a neutral zone, and secure the Duarte Bridge. After several political discussions General Palmer received permission for the airborne troops to linkup with the marines and establish secure lines of communications between the two forces.

General Palmer rejected all cease fire plans that included gaps between the Marines and the Army. The forces cleared a corridor that provided a relatively secure route United States forces could use to move equipment and supplies. It also split the rebel force and trapped 80% of the rebel troops in the rebel stronghold of Cuidad Nueva. United States forces quickly established checkpoints along the route. This prevented the rebel forces from fleeing the city and establishing an insurgent force in the countryside.

During the second phase of the stability operation United States troop strength grew to 24,000 soldiers. combat support and combat service support units began moving to the Dominican Republic to support ground operations. Support elements such as military police, signal units, military intelligence battalions, special forces (including civil affairs and PSYOPS) and medical units formed the support for the ground units. The Air Force also moved fighter and reconnaissance aircraft to Ramey Air Force Base, Puerto Rico to establish air superiority and to

support the assault forces in the Dominican Republic.¹⁶

Several diplomatic actions took place during Phase II that had an impact on military actions. Both the Organization of American States and the United States State Department lobbied for a cease fire accord and the establishment of a provisional government that included loyalists and constitutionalists. To reduce the violence, President Johnson instructed General Palmer to prevent loyalist troops, who were now part of the Government of National Reconstruction from using air and naval forces against the rebels. On 21 May when a Red Cross negotiated truce became a cease fire, the United States military finally became a neutral force.¹⁸

During phase III the United States military presence transitioned to a peacekeeping role. United States forces eventually became part of the Inter-American Peace Force headed by General Hugo Panasco Alvim from Brazil.¹⁷ United States forces continued to receive sniper fire when manning observation posts or patrolling in rebel territory. They responded to this threat by expanding security zones and conducting patrols. The last serious fighting between United States troops and the rebels took place on 15 -16 June 1965. Though the fighting grew intense General Palmer

refused to let American troops pursue the rebels once the attack disintegrated. The last United States forces left the country in September 1966.¹⁸

Operation Provide Comfort: Operation Provide Comfort provides a more recent example of United States forces engaging in operations to restore order. Provide Comfort was the multinational relief effort to provide humanitarian assistance and security for Kurdish refugees in southern Turkey and northern Iraq. At the end of Operation Desert Storm dissident factions in Iraq launched a movement to drive Saddam Hussein from power. Their attempt failed. Saddam Hussein responded by employing the Republican Guard against the dissident factions driving them towards the mountains of southern Turkey. By late March 1991 there were an estimated 500,000 refugees massed along the Turkey - Iraq border.¹⁹

There was widespread outrage at the plight of the Kurdish refugees. The trek to the mountains was extremely difficult. During March and April the mountainous regions in northern Iraq still exhibit winter conditions. The refugees trail could be traced by the abandoned possessions and the bodies of those too weak to withstand the cold. Nations that had been involved in the Desert Storm coalition banded together and began to airdrop supplies to the refugees.

On 5 April 1991 President Bush ordered the United States Department of Defense to provide relief for the fleeing refugees. The mission to execute Operation Provide Comfort went to the United States European Command. The mission quickly became a combined operation involving forces from thirteen nations and material contributions from thirty nations. By 19 April coalition forces in the area were organized under the control of General John Galvin, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The objectives for operation provide comfort were:

- a. Stop the dying and suffering/stabilize the population.
- b. Resettle the population at temporary sites; establish a sustainable, secure environment
- c. Return the population to their homes.²⁰

LTG John Shalikashvili, USA, became the commander of Combined Task Force Provide Comfort.

The first military forces to arrive on the scene were United States special forces. Brigadier General Richard Potter inserted soldiers from the United States Army 10th Special Forces Group into the area to began initial medical assistance and to assess security requirements. The special forces estimated about 600 people were dying each day from exposure.

disease, and malnutrition.²¹

The 10th Special Forces Group became the base for Task Force Alpha. The principal mission of the Task Force was to resupply the refugees. The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit Special Operations Capable (MEUSOC) supported 10th Special Forces Group by establishing a forward support base and refueling points for helicopters carrying supplies to refugee camps. Before the operation was over coalition forces would deliver a total of 17,00 tons of supplies to the refugee camps.²²

In order to return the refugees to their homes the coalition forces had to establish a security zone to ensure the refugees would be safe from the wrath of the Iraqi forces. Lieutenant General Shalikashvili assigned this task to Task Force Bravo which consisted of United States, British, French, Spanish, Italian, and Netherland forces. Major General Jay Garner, USA, was designated commander of the task force. Once Task Force Bravo neutralized the Iraqi forces, they would have to convince the Kurdish refugees it was safe to return to their homes.

Once Major General Garner established his headquarters in Zakhu, Iraq he sent liaisons to the Iraqi Army with instructions on his plans to separate

the Iraqi and the Kurds. The demarche was delivered by Lieutenant Colonel Tom Corwin, commander of one of the Marine Battalion Landing Teams. Fortunately, the Iraqi responded to the coalition's firmness and began to withdraw from the area designated as the security zone.

Getting the Iraqi force to leave the areas formerly occupied by the Kurds was a difficult task. Colonel Richard Naab, head of the military coordination center, met daily with Brigadier General Nashwan of the Iraqi Army to explain coalition plans to resettle the Kurds. Often the Iraqi responded with stubborn, but nonviolent resistance. Eventually the Iraqi military withdrew from each city the coalition forces designated for Kurdish resettlement.²³

III. Contingency Forces and Stability Operations.

The United States is currently reorganizing its forces to ensure we maintain a credible capability to respond to crisis abroad despite upcoming force reductions. The foundation of our military will be the base force. That force will consist of four parts: Strategic Forces, Pacific Forces, Atlantic Forces, and Contingency Forces. The base force consists of both active and reserve units integrated

into an effective military force structure however, forces responding to regional contingencies will initially be drawn largely from the active component.

This new organization gives the United States two options to respond to regional conflicts. If the contingency requires forces or capabilities that exceed the forward presence in that region the combatant commander can call upon crisis response forces apportioned to his region. If there are no forward response forces in the area or the crisis is unpredicted CONUS based contingency forces can be used to respond to the crisis.²⁴

Both the Atlantic and the Pacific forces will have crisis response forces which possess the training and mobility to help those commands conduct stability operations. The crisis response forces will train for regional contingencies based on the forward presence forces they will support. These forces will often augment their training by participating in deployments and exercises associated with their region. The crisis response forces can assist in stability operations by providing highly mobile ground forces which can include mechanized forces when necessary. The forces also include naval forces that can project power by controlling access to the area, amphibious forces capable of forced entry operations, and air

forces capable of air superiority and reconnaissance.

The United States based Contingency Force will be used to respond to unpredicted regional crisis. These forces are organized to be largely self sufficient. Current plans will include 5 army divisions, 7 Air Force Fighter Wings, and a Marine Expeditionary Force in the CONUS based contingency force.²⁵ At Appendix 1 is a chart showing the types of forces allocated for crisis response and contingency operations.

Each service is responsible for providing forces that will give the contingency force special operations, forced entry, combat support, and sustainment capabilities. The Army will contribute airborne, air assault, light infantry, and rapidly deployable heavy units to the force. The Air Force component will consist of fighters, fighter bombers, and long range bomber forces. The Marines will give the force an amphibious capability for forcible entry and non - combatant evacuation operations.

Reserve forces will also play an important role in the contingency force's overall capabilities. Reserve forces will maintain a high state of readiness so they can assist or augment the active components. They will also perform many of the early sealift and airlift missions. Each combatant commander will be able to draw from the United States based contingency

force during crisis response.

If United States military forces are to be successful in stability operations, the forces must be mobile, flexible, and well trained in operations to restore order. There are four tasks that units should be trained to execute before attempting stability operations; conduct forced entry operations, establish security zones, stabilize the population, and provide humanitarian assistance. Each task is vital to the overall success of the operation.

The task force must be prepared to conduct forced entry operations. Operations to restore order imply there is an unacceptable degree of violence taking place in the proposed area of operations. There is no guarantee that the belligerents will acknowledge the rights of any outside party to resolve the situation. To the contrary, both parties may turn against the externally imposed force and the situation could rapidly become more violent. The combatant commander must also plan for different types of forced entry operations. The force entry may require airborne entry to seize airfields, amphibious landings to seize ports or beaches, or operations to secure multiple locations simultaneously.

These forced entries will serve two purposes. The first reason for forced entry is to show the task

force's capability and determination to use force.

Another reason for forced entry is to secure a lodgment so the force can secure a base of operations for sustainment and future operations.

Although forced entry may be necessary to gain a lodgment, the commander and the forces involved should accomplish this task using the minimum violence possible. The role of the military force involved in operation to restore order is to induce the belligerents to seek a more peaceful solution. To reduce the probability of the escalation of violence the task force commander must use all intelligence available to determine how much force is necessary, establish rules of engagement that allow mission accomplishment while protecting the force, and to determine how he will apply more force if the situation deteriorates into intense combat.

The next task the task force must accomplish is to establish security zones. This is a difficult task. The security zones should be drawn in a manner that facilitate control of the populace and separation of the belligerents. Planning staffs must consider the geography of the area, the social system, and the forces available when establishing security zones. During Operation Power Pack military advisors and state department personnel were invaluable in this

process.²⁶ During Operation Provide Comfort special forces personnel provided intelligence that helped determine the security requirements.²⁷

When establishing the security zone it is important that the task force attempts to establish a military liaison with the belligerents in the area. The purpose of a security zone is to separate the belligerents thereby decreasing the violence and easing tensions. The role of the liaison officer is to provide the belligerents accurate firsthand information on the intent of the intervening force. The liaison officer can also be used to deliver instructions and ultimatums concerning the clearance and expansion of the security zone, cease fire agreements, and safe havens for those who no longer want to participate in the fighting. During Operation Power Pack the Marines quickly established a security zone around the United States Embassy so that there was a safe place to conduct diplomatic and military liaisons.²⁸ During Operation Provide Comfort Task Force Bravo established a security zone large enough to use as a temporary camp site for Kurdish refugees who could not return to their homes.²⁹

After the establishment of initial security zones the commander must stabilize the population. This is a complex task. Threats to the population could come

from several sources. One source is the belligerents. Innocent civilians could be trapped between the belligerents resulting in unnecessary casualties. They may also find themselves at the mercy of well armed government forces who are determined to quell an insurrection or punish any sympathizers. As the proliferation of modern weapons continue, citizens are more likely to find themselves the victims of artillery or aerial bombardments of conventional munitions or chemical munitions.

The first step in stabilizing the population is to decrease the fighting. If political authorities are unable to accomplish this action through a truce or a cease fire the military commander may have to conduct patrols to ferret out pockets of resistance and to neutralize those factions determined to continue the violence. This requires patrolling urban areas and establishing checkpoints and curfews to control the population. As in Operation Power Pack it may be necessary to close airfields and seize equipment to limit the amount of violence belligerents can inflict upon each other thereby reducing the suffering of the population.³⁰

Stabilizing the population is one of the most dangerous tasks in stability operations. To prevent an escalation in violence troops must be well

disciplined and trained in crowd control. The commander must also establish clear rules of engagement that allow friendly forces to protect themselves yet limit collateral damage to acceptable levels. During Operation Power Pack there were several instances where the rules of engagement prevented soldiers from using the firepower necessary to control the situation.³¹

Once the forces involved in the operation have stopped the suffering and dying, forces can shift their attention and assets to providing widespread humanitarian assistance. The purpose of this assistance is to meet the needs of the population, restore the social infrastructure, and to prevent a return to violence. By bringing in supplies to provide food, medical care, and shelter, the forces can meet the immediate needs of the society while diplomats make the arrangements to transition control of the area to peacekeeping forces.

Providing humanitarian assistance can strain both manpower and equipment. Depending on the location of the conflict, the relief effort may have to provide camps with temporary shelter and sanitation facilities or to restore water, power, and communications to an urban area. Providing food for displaced persons can also be a logistics nightmare. The movement of food

and other supplies across air and ground lines of communications will require aircraft, helicopters, and motor transport. During 5-7 April 1991, the initial days of Operation Provide Comfort, military personnel and equipment delivered more than 25,000 pounds of food, water, shelters, and medical supplies for distribution to Kurdish refugee camps. Before the operation was complete the combined forces delivered over 27,000 tons of supplies to over 850,000 refugees. Eventually the relief operation was transferred to civilian agencies ³²

Before the phased redeployment of the task force begins political and military leaders must ensure there are adequate forces left to enforce continued stability in the area. The purpose of these stay behind forces is to patrol the area and monitor the situation until peacekeeping forces have taken over full responsibility for the region. The forces can accomplish this mission by patrolling security zones and manning checkpoints and outposts. Stay behind forces can also continue to provide humanitarian assistance. Stay behind forces show the coalition's continued interest in peace and ensure the level of violence continues to decrease.

Another key to success in stability operations is flexibility. During the operation there will be

conflicting priorities for the commander and his planning staff. Demands for supplies and manpower to assist in stabilizing the population and provide humanitarian relief will often compete with the demand for supplies and equipment to establish and expand the security zone. Consequently the commander and his staff will have to constantly reevaluate the priorities for supplies, equipment, and manpower.

Flexibility helps the force react to changes. Along with the uncertainties of the belligerents reactions to outside influences, the commander and his staff must be prepared for changes in the command and control structure for the operation. Contingency forces may find themselves involved in unilateral actions ordered by the United States National Command Authority or they may be part of a combined task force involving forces from many nations.

During unilateral operations contingency forces may be called upon to support a regional combatant commander or they may operate as part of Contingency Command. When supporting a regional CINC contingency forces must ensure they establish early liaison with the combatant command. The liaison personnel must aggressively pursue information and intelligence on the status of the operation, intelligence updates, rules of engagement, and civil-military cooperation.

The purpose of this information is to ensure the contingency forces are properly equipped and mentally prepared for the task at hand. The information can also prove invaluable as the force adjusts its packing list and prepares for deployment.

As the world seeks alternative methods for resolving conflicts United States contingency forces are more likely to find themselves operating as part of a combined task force. Organizing a combined task force presents unique problems for the commander. It is not likely that the staff can align the mission requirements neatly along national lines.

During combined operations centralized planning with decentralized execution will allow the commander maximum flexibility. Subordinate commanders will be responsible for accomplishing the task force commander's intent in their area of responsibility. To ensure unity of effort in an environment where there is legitimate competition for limited resources it is important that subordinate commanders know what forces and resources they control as well as the forces and resources they do not control.

Task forces should be formed based on functional responsibility. Units from the different nations should be assigned specific tasks, based on a balance of their desires and capabilities. Commanders of the

separate national organizations can retain operational control of their forces while responding to the tactical control of their task force commander.

This type of organization worked well during Operation Provide Comfort. Ground forces were divided into two task forces. Task Force Alpha was responsible for stabilizing the refugee population. They established routes and control points to move the refugees into camps and prepare them to return to their homes. The bulk of the logistics burden fell on units supporting Task Force Alpha. Task Force Bravo received the mission to establish a security zone that separated the Kurdish refugees from Iraqi military forces bent on punishing the dissidents. Task Force Bravo was also responsible for humanitarian relief in their area of operations. Other forces were organized by component and given specific missions that supported the overall operation.³³

During future combined force stability operations personalities will play an important role in the working relationships and effectiveness of the force. Unlike Operations Power Pack and Provide Comfort, United States contingency forces may find themselves working for a command structure that does not lead back to our own National Command Authority. United States forces may find themselves part of a coalition

that responds to international organizations such as the United Nations or the Western European Union.

Over the last two years there have been moves by the leaders in the former Soviet Union to reactivate the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations. The United Nations Charter states the purpose of the committee is to advise and assist on military requirements for the maintenance of peace and security. The committee has been inactive since 1948. Former leaders of the Soviet Union, President Gorbachev and Chief of the Armed Forces, General Moiseyev, stated they wanted to reactivate the committee so the Soviet Union could be more active in western efforts to maintain international peace and security. Although the United States has officially resisted movements to reactivate the committee, the United States military advisor to the United Nations Ambassador admits there may be some utility and efficiency gained by using members of the committee to assist in the management of United Nations peacekeeping operations.³⁴

The Western European Union is also taking a more active role in stability operations. The committee formed in 1955 lapsed into dysfunction but reemerged in 1984 in order to provide members with a more active role in European security deliberations. It played a major role in the Gulf War crisis by coordinating

sanctions against Iraq and by coordinating the military presence of member countries during Operation Desert Storm. If present trends continue the Western European Union will play a more active role in coordinating military responses to crisis that are outside the area of the NATO charter.³⁰

As United States forces find themselves operating with other countries they will have to adjust to the complications caused by operating with friendly units that have a different way of doing business. In these situations personalities may well determine how soon and at what price the task force accomplishes the mission. Unit commanders should seek the expertise of their political adviser to determine which allied national interests will add or detract from mission accomplishment. Commanders must also realize that other nations operate along different command and control structures that may require they seek approval from their national authorities before carrying out certain orders. Planners will have to consider that many units, although highly professional, will need assistance in the area of fire support and logistics before they can accomplish their mission. However, as we seek more international cooperation in solving conflicts the synergism and good will gained by combined operation will far outweigh the liabilities.

IV. CONCLUSION.

The world has undergone many changes during the past five years. Many nations are blazing new paths toward political and economic independence. Several European societies have already made the transition to democratic forms of government. Now that the cold war is over the United States, NATO and former Soviet Republics are entering an era of peaceful cooperation in the areas of economics and weapons control.

However, there are still several threats to the national security of the United States. Our most pressing problem is a declining national economy. The United States, once a leader in world economics, now finds itself in tremendous debt. Our annual deficit is rising annually and economists predict our national debt will reach 3 trillion dollars by the end of fiscal year 1992!**

Increasing debt combined with a decrease in the military threat to our national security has resulted in significant decreases in the budget allocated for America's military forces. To continue operating on reduced resources we must revamp our military forces. All services will have to make difficult decisions concerning personnel, equipment, and organization. Regardless of the budget the role of America's

military forces has not changed; it is to provide for the common defense of the United States and our national interests.³⁷

The end of the cold war has cast an additional burden on America's military forces. Since the United States is the only remaining superpower, many nations look to us to take the lead in the projection of diplomatic and military power to induce conflict resolution and regional stability. This is not to say that nations expect America to shoulder this burden alone. Many nations participated with the United States in Operation Desert Storm. An equally large number of nations volunteered participation in Operation Provide Comfort to rescue the Kurdish refugees from a vengeful Iraqi Army.

European nations are also looking to strengthen European cooperation in regional security affairs. The Western European Union coordinated efforts to impose economic sanctions on Iraq. They also assisted in arranging European military participation in Operation Desert Storm that could not have been accomplished under the NATO charter.

Despite all the advances toward international cooperation there are still several disturbing trends towards regional instabilities. Many nations are frustrated that the gap between the standards of

living in developed nations and third world countries continue to grow. Long standing border disputes between many nations that formerly served as Soviet buffer states continue to be fueled by ethnic grievances and intrastate competition for declining resources.

The biggest danger to international stability is the continued weapons proliferation in third world nations. The world's major nuclear powers, the United States and the Commonwealth of Independent States, are making heroic efforts to reduce the number of nuclear and chemical weapons in their arsenals. However their efforts toward stability are being countermanaged by the efforts of other nations to threaten their neighbors by expanding their arsenals and by their attempts to gain the technology necessary to produce their own weapons of mass destruction.

To respond to domestic needs and global challenges the United States military must be prepared to use contingency forces to conduct operation to restore order. For many years nations have relied on the United Nations to devise peaceful resolutions to low intensity regional conflicts. As we turn our attentions away from the cold war and realize the intense personal suffering caused by some of these conflicts, the million of deaths attributed to the

civil war in Ethiopia for example, nations are realizing that military force is an acceptable way to prevent tyrants or civil wars from causing undue suffering to an innocent population. It may also be a way to prevent the use of military power as a tool of imperialism or terrorism by stronger nations against weaker border states.

If United States military forces want to be successful in stability operations they must be flexible and mobile. Task force commanders must understand how to separate the belligerents and stop the violence while ensuring they allow freedom of action that protects the friendly force. The overall objective of United States forces conducting stability operations should be to restore order while having a minimal impact on the local population. This requires a well thought out plan to gradually apply military force in pursuit of political objectives.

To meet the challenges of the future the United States military must take advantage of this lull in the Cold War to consider a new and challenging problem. Throughout the Cold War the United States and her allies planned how to defeat attacking Warsaw Pact forces using maneuver and massed firepower. The Warsaw Pact crumbled and the allies emerged victorious without engaging in armed conflict. If the United

States wants to reap the full benefits of this victory we must plan how to support America's new role in international affairs. The United States military must learn how to make peace.

U. S. BASED CONTINGENCY FORCES

ARMY

NAVY

USMC

AIR FORCE

4 DIV

**FORCES FROM ATLANTIC
& PACIFIC**

8 SL -7s

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AS NECESSARY

7 FIGHTER WINGS

INTERTHEATER LIFT

ATLANTIC CRISIS RESPONSE FORCES

ARMY

NAVY

USMC

AIR FORCE

3 HVY DIV

4 CARRIER

1 MEF

2 FIGHTER WINGS

6 RES DIV

11 RES FIGHTER

WINGS

PACIFIC CRISIS RESPONSE FORCES

ARMY

NAVY

USMC

AIR FORCE

1 DIV

**5 CARRIER
GROUPS**

1 FIGHTER WING

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